Re: [PATCH v3 04/16] platform/x86/intel/ifs: Remove memory allocation from load path

[Hans de Goede]

Hi,

On 11/17/22 20:59, Jithu Joseph wrote:
> IFS requires tests to be authenticated once for each CPU socket
> on a system.
> 
> scan_chunks_sanity_check() was dynamically allocating memory
> to store the state of whether tests have been authenticated on
> each socket for every load operation.
> 
> Move the memory allocation to init path and store the pointer
> in ifs_data struct.
> 
> Also rearrange the adjacent error checking in init for a
> more simplified and natural flow.
> 
> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@xxxxxxxxx>
> Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Jithu Joseph <jithu.joseph@xxxxxxxxx>
> ---
>  - Replaced global pkg_auth pointer to struct ifs_data (Hans)
>  - Rearrange the adjacent error checking flow in ifs_init (Hans)
>  - With this change there are conflicts in patches 11 and 12 (I will
>     post the updated 11 and 12 if this is satisfactory)

Thanks, this patch looks good to me now:

Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>

Regards,

Hans


> 
>  drivers/platform/x86/intel/ifs/ifs.h  |  2 ++
>  drivers/platform/x86/intel/ifs/core.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++----
>  drivers/platform/x86/intel/ifs/load.c | 14 ++++----------
>  3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/intel/ifs/ifs.h b/drivers/platform/x86/intel/ifs/ifs.h
> index 3ff1d9aaeaa9..8de1952a1b7b 100644
> --- a/drivers/platform/x86/intel/ifs/ifs.h
> +++ b/drivers/platform/x86/intel/ifs/ifs.h
> @@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ union ifs_status {
>   * struct ifs_data - attributes related to intel IFS driver
>   * @integrity_cap_bit: MSR_INTEGRITY_CAPS bit enumerating this test
>   * @loaded_version: stores the currently loaded ifs image version.
> + * @pkg_auth: array of bool storing per package auth status
>   * @loaded: If a valid test binary has been loaded into the memory
>   * @loading_error: Error occurred on another CPU while loading image
>   * @valid_chunks: number of chunks which could be validated.
> @@ -199,6 +200,7 @@ union ifs_status {
>   */
>  struct ifs_data {
>  	int	integrity_cap_bit;
> +	bool	*pkg_auth;
>  	int	loaded_version;
>  	bool	loaded;
>  	bool	loading_error;
> diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/intel/ifs/core.c b/drivers/platform/x86/intel/ifs/core.c
> index 5fb7f655c291..943eb2a17c64 100644
> --- a/drivers/platform/x86/intel/ifs/core.c
> +++ b/drivers/platform/x86/intel/ifs/core.c
> @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
>  #include <linux/module.h>
>  #include <linux/kdev_t.h>
>  #include <linux/semaphore.h>
> +#include <linux/slab.h>
>  
>  #include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
>  
> @@ -34,6 +35,7 @@ static int __init ifs_init(void)
>  {
>  	const struct x86_cpu_id *m;
>  	u64 msrval;
> +	int ret;
>  
>  	m = x86_match_cpu(ifs_cpu_ids);
>  	if (!m)
> @@ -50,16 +52,26 @@ static int __init ifs_init(void)
>  
>  	ifs_device.misc.groups = ifs_get_groups();
>  
> -	if ((msrval & BIT(ifs_device.data.integrity_cap_bit)) &&
> -	    !misc_register(&ifs_device.misc))
> -		return 0;
> +	if (!(msrval & BIT(ifs_device.data.integrity_cap_bit)))
> +		return -ENODEV;
> +
> +	ifs_device.data.pkg_auth = kmalloc_array(topology_max_packages(), sizeof(bool), GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!ifs_device.data.pkg_auth)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +	ret = misc_register(&ifs_device.misc);
> +	if (ret) {
> +		kfree(ifs_device.data.pkg_auth);
> +		return ret;
> +	}
>  
> -	return -ENODEV;
> +	return 0;
>  }
>  
>  static void __exit ifs_exit(void)
>  {
>  	misc_deregister(&ifs_device.misc);
> +	kfree(ifs_device.data.pkg_auth);
>  }
>  
>  module_init(ifs_init);
> diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/intel/ifs/load.c b/drivers/platform/x86/intel/ifs/load.c
> index 89ce265887ea..8423c486d11b 100644
> --- a/drivers/platform/x86/intel/ifs/load.c
> +++ b/drivers/platform/x86/intel/ifs/load.c
> @@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
>  
>  #include <linux/firmware.h>
>  #include <asm/cpu.h>
> -#include <linux/slab.h>
>  #include <asm/microcode_intel.h>
>  
>  #include "ifs.h"
> @@ -118,16 +117,12 @@ static void copy_hashes_authenticate_chunks(struct work_struct *work)
>   */
>  static int scan_chunks_sanity_check(struct device *dev)
>  {
> -	int metadata_size, curr_pkg, cpu, ret = -ENOMEM;
> +	int metadata_size, curr_pkg, cpu, ret;
>  	struct ifs_data *ifsd = ifs_get_data(dev);
> -	bool *package_authenticated;
>  	struct ifs_work local_work;
>  	char *test_ptr;
>  
> -	package_authenticated = kcalloc(topology_max_packages(), sizeof(bool), GFP_KERNEL);
> -	if (!package_authenticated)
> -		return ret;
> -
> +	memset(ifsd->pkg_auth, 0, (topology_max_packages() * sizeof(bool)));
>  	metadata_size = ifs_header_ptr->metadata_size;
>  
>  	/* Spec says that if the Meta Data Size = 0 then it should be treated as 2000 */
> @@ -150,7 +145,7 @@ static int scan_chunks_sanity_check(struct device *dev)
>  	cpus_read_lock();
>  	for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
>  		curr_pkg = topology_physical_package_id(cpu);
> -		if (package_authenticated[curr_pkg])
> +		if (ifsd->pkg_auth[curr_pkg])
>  			continue;
>  		reinit_completion(&ifs_done);
>  		local_work.dev = dev;
> @@ -161,12 +156,11 @@ static int scan_chunks_sanity_check(struct device *dev)
>  			ret = -EIO;
>  			goto out;
>  		}
> -		package_authenticated[curr_pkg] = 1;
> +		ifsd->pkg_auth[curr_pkg] = 1;
>  	}
>  	ret = 0;
>  out:
>  	cpus_read_unlock();
> -	kfree(package_authenticated);
>  
>  	return ret;
>  }